

~~SECRET~~  
Security Information

Official Diary

Monday, 26 January 1953

- 25X1A9a 1. In the morning chatted briefly with 25X1A9a respecting 25X1A6a his availability for the post of 25X1A9a indicated that he would be unavailable for personal reasons, and I so informed Mr. Dulles. Alternate suggestions discussed with 25X1A9a No conclusion was reached.
- 25X1A9a 2. At the request of Mr. Dulles and 25X1A9a discussed with Messrs. Amory and 25X1A9a the plans for a briefing on Soviet Cold War activities for the Jackson Committee. I later persuaded the DD/P complex that the briefing should be given by their representatives, 25X1A9a the DD/I offices to afford such support as they could. 25X1A9a cleared this with 25X1A9a
3. With Mr. Dulles et al reviewed arrangements for the briefing of the Rockefeller Committee.
- 25X9A6 4. At the request of Mr. Dulles secured from OCD 25X9A6 25X9A6
- 25X1A9a 5. Chatted briefly at the morning meeting on the subject of CIA legislation. I expressed the view that military personnel occupying senior CIA positions should not receive compensation in excess of the amount stipulated for civilians occupying the same position. Attention was called to the fact of military allowances and income tax advantages enjoyed by personnel receiving military pay and allowances. I raised the question as to whether or not the law could be drawn so as to permit such individuals to receive their military pay and allowances (and the income tax advantages thereof) but to provide that the total received should not exceed the compensation fixed for a civilian occupying the same position. 25X1A9a had grave question as to whether this could be done.
6. Discussed briefly with General Roth the "B" project. He desired clarification with respect to the "minimum basis" of continuance of the project as recommended in our recent memorandum for the record. I clarified this by suggesting that no new capital investment should be made and current expenses should be held at a minimum necessary to carry on operations, to maintain existing facilities, and to complete such construction as would deteriorate if stopped in mid-course. I suggested to General Roth that if Defense determined to continue this project on a stand-by basis, it was imperative that we determine upon an early survey

This document is part of an integrated file. If separated from the file it must be subjected to individual systematic review.

~~SECRET~~  
Security Information

(cont'd)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Security Information

Official Diary  
26 January 1953

thereof. At the same time General Roth showed me a memorandum signed by Acting Secretary McNeil prior to receipt of CIA's memorandum for the record, determining that Defense would ascertain whether or not CIA would take over the project and, if it would not, resolving to have the project phased out. This memorandum, in my view, was not inconsistent with the views expressed in CIA's memorandum for the record, since it could be interpreted in such a way as to permit continuance of the project on a minimal basis during the period necessary for CIA to make its determination whether or not to take over the project. General Roth also inquired whether CIA would be willing to assume the financing of this project as of January 1, 1953, or as of this date. I said that it would not, although CIA might consider a proposal to the effect that if CIA determined to adopt the project, it would assume expenses during the period of the investigation. If it did not, no expenses would be assumed. General Roth did not indicate whether or not such a proposal would be made. I later informed Mr. Dulles of this discussion and he approved my general approach.

could  
ADSI

25X1A9a  
7. [REDACTED] consulted me with respect to certain revisions in the work of the supergrade board requested by [REDACTED] and I suggested that he speak directly with DD/A.

25X1A9a      25X1A9a      25X1A9a  
8. [REDACTED] spoke to me and expressed grave concern as to the attitude of the Board of National Estimates respecting the decision that the semi-annual Atomic Energy Estimate be classified as a SE. After some discussion I indicated to [REDACTED] that, in view of the Board's feelings on this matter (based upon their pride of authorship of the SE series) I would be entirely willing to reverse my decision and have this paper produced as NSIE (National Scientific Intelligence Estimate) #1. Irrespective of this decision, I felt that the Board was making a serious error. This was a highly important field of national intelligence which was relied upon heavily by the policy makers. If current Board of National Estimates procedures were not adequate to deal with matters of this highly technical type, I felt that the Board should revise its procedures rather than abdicating jurisdiction of such a highly important field of intelligence. I felt strongly enough about this to desire to discuss it with the entire Board and I arranged to do so on Tuesday morning.

no need  
[Handwritten signature/initials]

25X1A9a  
9. [REDACTED] of ONE phoned and indicated that he was satisfied with the OCI article on the current Soviet purges, although he regarded it as nothing more than a tentative current intelligence view. I had fully understood this.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~  
Security Information

Official Diary  
26 January 1953

25X1A9a

10. Discussed with 25X1A9a relations with Captain Layton, who is Chief of Intelligence for Admiral Radford. I explained to 25X1A9a why CIA had felt it necessary to withdraw from the recent tripartite conference in Singapore. 25X1A9a indicated that Radford and Layton would be coming to Washington in the near future and might raise some question respecting this conference with DCI or D/DCI. Also discussed briefly with 25X1A9a the possibility of afford- 25X1A9a ing better intelligence support to various Far East field units through a chief of intelligence on the staff of Admiral Overesch.

11. Chatted with Mr. McBride, WE in State, who indicated that Douglas Dillon would be in Washington during the week of February 9 or that of February 16. He will reserve some time for a CIA briefing and will phone us later with a specific date. Mr. McBride was willing to have the CIA briefing any time during the first three days of next week but, in view of the pressure on Mr. Dillon's schedule, I did not request this.

12. Mr. Dulles referred to a verbal report by 25X1A9a that the Communists had a film on BW involving confessions by American flyers and also that the Communists had so reindoctrinated certain American prisoners that a number of them would refuse to be repatriated and some might even take up arms against the U.S. With respect to the film, I undertook 25X1A9a to arrange a showing in the Director's Conference Room and requested 25X1A9a to carry through. With respect to the Intelligence Report, I expressed some surprise, since I was not aware that we had any reliable intelligence respecting intelligence in American PW camps. I requested 25X1A9a to have OCI ascertain whether or not there were any reliable reports to this effect.

25X1A9a



Security Information